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The
People's War in Nepal: Maoists' Strategy
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October
2005
| Nepal's
Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy |
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| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
In
less than ten years, the Maoist insurgency has transformed Nepal. The Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) has spread armed conflict across the country and
reshaped its political environment irrevocably. But their political aims
are still questioned, and not enough is known about their structure and
strategy. This background report seeks to fill in many of the gaps, based
on close study of their writings and actions and a wide range of interviews,
in order to provide policymakers in Nepal and the international community
with information and insights needed to approach a peace process realistically.
The
Maoists are at heart a political party. They have developed military capacity
but it is subordinated to political control. They use terror tactics and
coercion but they are not simply terrorists. They maintain links to other
communist revolutionary groups on the subcontinent but they are neither
Khmer Rouge clones nor is their campaign part of any global terrorism.
Maoist
strategy is of a protracted people's war, both political and military --
the two cannot be separated. They have a long-term vision, and they have
patience. They can be extremely astute politically (their September 2005
unilateral ceasefire announcement) but can also make grave miscalculations
in terms of their own long-term objectives (their mishandling of leadership
differences in early 2005).
The
Maoists are not likely to collapse because of internal disputes. There
are undoubtedly tensions within the top leadership and challenges of command
and control but these do not add up to fatal weaknesses. The state's security-driven
agenda under a succession of governments lacking legitimacy has only further
strengthened their position.
The
insurgents are pragmatic and tactically flexible. They are aware they will
not win an outright military victory and have realised that an instant
transition to socialism is impossible. They are willing to compromise to
some degree and are keen to engage with domestic and international political
forces.
The
Maoists have employed force for political ends since the start of their
armed campaign in 1996. They have used torture, execution and other forms
of violence including terror and extortion. But they have also been more
restrained than many insurgent groups: they have limited civilian casualties
and generally avoided indiscriminate attacks. They have left the economy
functional, if weakened, and have never targeted foreign nationals.
The
Maoists are sensitive to domestic and international opinion. However, despite
their philosophy of people's war they are not dependent on popular support.
The seriousness of their engagement in any peace process will depend on
their perceptions of risks and opportunities. The international community
may play an important role in shaping these.
Senior
Maoist leaders may well be motivated by a genuine desire for social and
economic transformation. Their pursuit of domestic transformation takes
precedence over their professed commitment to global revolution. They are
more interested in controlling development efforts across Nepal and consolidating
their grip on local populations' daily lives.
That
the Maoists must be dealt with realistically is something Nepal's mainstream
politicians have long understood. Having been on the receiving end of many
of the rebels' most brutal assaults, they harbour no illusions about Maoist
respect for political dissent. But at the same time they see the possibility
of using both carrot and stick to persuade the Maoists to engage with them
politically with the aim of getting agreement on a common program that
would address certain of their demands that have won widespread support.
The
Maoists themselves have acted pragmatically throughout much of the conflict.
They have always kept in mind the need to hold the door open for future
rehabilitation and reconciliation and have maintained a dialogue with mainstream
forces partly to this end. They have also adopted a moderate policy towards
international development efforts and have long called for international
facilitation of a peace process.
Behaviour
towards the newly established United Nations human rights mission will
be a crucial test of Maoist attitudes and capacities. If they can prove
that they are ready for peace and capable of implementing a negotiated
settlement, the political mainstream will be ready to deal with them. Judging
by widespread popular relief following their September 2005 declaration
of a unilateral three-month ceasefire, Nepal's people would back a reasonable
compromise that delivers peace.
| Source:
International Crisis Group 2005 |
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External
link |
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